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I would like to begin this essay with three riffs on three different scenarios. First, 
of late I have become the extended ‘owner’ and custodian of my son’s dog. My son 
has always been an animal lover and till his advent into my life, I had led a life 
sequestered from animals. Between me and animals, it had always been a case of 
distant, unrelated, separate coexistence. I have learned a lot from my son and of 
late, I have had more than my share of taking care of the dog who by the way is 
just plain gorgeous and adorable. Now we coexist meaningfully under the same 
roof, very much mutually mediated. I have been thinking a lot, along the lines 
opened up by Jacques Derrida’s essay on the animal that he is, about the meaning, 
both tacit and explicit, of our co-existence: mine and the dogs.1 He loves human 
company perennially and lets you know quite volubly that he is unhappy when he 
is excluded from human togetherness. Recently, I was exasperated by his persis-
tent barking and whining, and I shouted out to him, ‘For God’s sake Toofan, know 
your place,’ and having said it, instantly I froze in horror. Had I just said what I 
had? Had I proven to myself that I was a species Nazi, a species racist? Who or 
what had spoken via me when I had thundered in putative omniscience, Know 
your place. Had I meant, separate but equal: had I intended apartheid with a se-
parate canine Bantustan for him? Clearly, he could have barked back, or maybe 
he did and I did not understand, at me in contrapuntal reciprocity, ‘You know your 
place.’ On whose behalf had I produced the absolute and a priori demand that he 
better know his place as a precondition of his coexistence with me? Did I know my 
place, or as the human hegemon had I masterfully unmarked myself within this 
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relationship so as to regulate and normativise my relationship with Toofan, from 
my human all too human and anthropocentric perspective?2  
What kind of knowledge is implied in the imperative ‘know your place?’ 
How does living space suddenly become a structured, hierarchical place? Why 
should the act of knowing turn into a performance of carceral limitation and seg-
regation?3 Ok, he is a dog and I am a human being. So, what? What are the conse-
quences of this stated difference? Should the act of knowing impose absolute lim-
its and non-permeable boundaries between cats and dogs, dogs and humans, hu-
mans and other kinds of humans based on race, skin color, caste, gender, class, 
and so on? Doesn’t the injunction carry with it the force of punishment: should 
you transgress your place, or understand it erroneously; beware, you will be pun-
ished. You will be pushed back and locked up within your canine space. There is a 
complicated connection between knowledge, identity, and placement. When Too-
fan had insisted on my company as though he were a fellow human being, my 
response had been: know your place as a dog. Once you know who you are, you 
will not transgress your proper place and you will not make demands that are in-
commensurable with your identity. It is on this basis of so-called ‘place within a 
given structure’ that a number of vicious questions arise. What does a single 
mother want? What does a black lesbian want? What does an immigrant want? 
What does a guest worker want? If your identity is upgraded, for example from 
transient worker to permanent resident or legitimate citizen, then, the relation-
ship between knowledge and place is renegotiated. What I am pointing towards is 
the double-faced reality that though, existentially speaking, coexistence is a given, 
it needs to be validated through the production of a secondary discourse of rights 
and categories and ironically, it is the selective granting and withholding of rights 
to select target groups that renders equal co-existence unequal, un-egalitarian, 
and exclusionary. Categories create divides and perpetuate hierarchy which in 
turn perpetuates the logic of a given place within a sanctioned structure. 
The problem is that the dog has to be addressed as a dog and not as a bear 
or as a plant or as a human being. Difference has to be acknowledged, named, and 
honoured but within a double gaze of recognition. The double-ness of the rhetoric 
of co-existence can be characterised thus: on the one hand, the ontology of coex-
istence dissolves and de-territorialises the logic, or what we could after Amitav 
Ghosh, term “the shadow lines” of sovereign or ontic subjectivity, but, in doing 
this, it also activates the very logic that it seeks to transcend by way of the co-
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existential exhortation.4 It is a contradictory and double-conscious coexistence, a 
doubleness that is the singular burden of the human hegemon, whereby the nom-
inal logic of the ‘as’ has to be instrumentalised and bracketed at the same time. 
The dog has to be a dog to be eventually realised as a canine point of entry into the 
indivisibility of cosmic/planetary Being. To know who one is and to know one’s 
place can either harden into a casteist practice of untouchability; or such knowing 
can be performed porously and openendedly with a critical awareness that one’s 
given location and subject positionality are not ends in themselves but are indeed 
narratological nodal points and conjunctures within a larger and nameless Be-
coming.5 To avail of Martin Heidegger and the work of William V. Spanos that 
builds with critical rigour on the legacy of Heidegger, the ontic is both a relational 
form of difference from the ontological and is at the same time an exemplar of the 
ontico-ontological continuum.6 
The other two examples have to do with kings from South Indian mythology 
each of whom outdoes the other in ontological solicitude and generosity. In the 
first story, King Paari during his travels through his kingdom perceives a creeper 
languishing for lack of a supporting surface and ergo, he leaves his chariot behind 
as the prop for the creeper and walks back home. The other story has a king vol-
unteer his own son as a sacrificial offer to satisfy a cow’s demand for justice. The 
cow comes to the king’s court to complain that the prince had recklessly run his 
chariot over the calf and killed it instantly. These stories have brought tears to my 
eyes; either that, or I have laughed at the sheer absurdity of the situation, and 
more specifically, at the wrong-headedness of the king who in his zeal to combat 
rampant anthropocentrism ends up a prisoner to a pathos that is no less anthro-
pocentric in persuasion. Clearly, the creeper wasn’t looking for his chariot; and as 
for the other case, to adopt an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth mode of justice 
and exchanging a human life for road-kill is just plain preposterous. A calf’s life 
and a human life are both lives; but they are not automatically fungible within the 
rationale of life’s indivisibility.7 Despite the compelling logic of life’s indivisibility, 
taxonomy, rubrics, and modes of inter and intra-species differentiation do creep 
in and complicate the issue. Categories of differentiation are both warranted and 
are in the way of an inclusive and non-hierarchical realisation of the true meaning 
of coexistence. The problem I am pointing towards is simply this: how does one 
administer coexistence as normative policy? It is one thing to celebrate, on a phe-
nomenological register, the one-ness of all life and the sacredness of co-existence 
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across borders and boundaries; but it is something quite different to achieve co-
existence normatively, governmentally. In whose name, under what imprimatur, 
is this to be imagined and actualised? Or, is normativity along with the need for 
an imprimatur to be cast away as inimical to an undifferentiated solicitude for all 
of life?  
To exist has no meaning except as a form of co-existence. To exist is to co-
exist. We already coexist before we exist. Individual existences transpire in the 
field called co-existence. Coexistence is neither the summing up nor the synthesis 
of existence. Co-existence by very definition cannot take on a proper or exemplary 
subject, i.e., I coexist, but always with: Mitsein, not just Dasein.8 Jean-Luc Nancy, 
for example, criticises Heidegger for privileging Dasein (Being there) over Mitsein 
(Being–with). Nancy’s diagnostic recognition of the “monstrous presence of the 
One”9 leads him to an advocacy of a “being together without assemblage.”10 Even 
as I agree with Nancy for the most part, I would maintain, despite Heidegger’s 
‘error,’ that in fact Dasein leads to an effective practice of Mitsein for the simple 
reason that Dasein is fundamentally and constitutively ek-static. Unlike the cen-
tered being of the human, the ek-static orientation of Dasein lends itself to 
Mitsein. It is precisely because Dasein is not self-contained and auto-telic that it 
finds in the indeterminacy of the ‘there’ genuine possibilities for coexistence. The 
putative opposition of the One and the Many is thus resolved both ontologically 
and epistemologically. The questions that follow immediately are: as human be-
ings, who do we coexist as, and Whom do we co-exist with? It is immediately ob-
vious that these two questions are intimately braided. If the as seems to focus on 
our autonomy to choose what roles we want to play in and by ourselves, the with 
immediately and normatively brings to our attention that our autonomy to choose 
is itself heteronomous. For, autonomy cannot mean pulling away from co-exist-
ence as the larger and inclusive horizon that accommodates our existence for our-
selves. We cannot be rigidly and normatively who we are so as to rule out the po-
tential for common ground with other normativities and socio-political tropisms 
and tendencies. “Other people should not be hell” to ensure that “we” are in “our” 
secluded heaven.11 The challenge is this: in identifying ourselves as Hindu or sec-
ular or agnostic or feminist, how porous and negotiable are we and how capable 
are we of coexisting non-hegemonically with others of different persuasions? And, 
what if there are folks with whom we may not want to coexist: Nazis, Islama-
phobes, misogynists, casteists, racists, and this list can be quite interminable? 
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The more relevant questions would be, will a Hindu co-exist, within the 
confines of the same community, with a non-Hindu? Will a Zionist Jew be pre-
pared to co-exist in equality with a Palestinian Arab, and under what aegis? How 
in the first place do we get to be a Hindu or a Christian except by the pure fortui-
tous accident of birth? What umbrella or what neutral and egalitarian third term 
would be necessary to effect such a coexistence? Would that term, such as secu-
larity, democracy, or the nation-state and the template of citizenship drop from 
heaven as an immaculate a priori; or would the parties concerned need to work 
toward the critical-immanent production of such a neutral and inclusive horizon? 
It would be disingenuous to claim with utter ontological innocence that we exist 
simply and purely as human beings. It is only by existing as Germans, as Hindus, 
as Muslims, as secularists, as agnostics, as African-Americans that each of us ad-
dresses and invokes the ‘ontologically human’ differentially and relationally. In 
other words, the only honourable and trustworthy way to demonstrate the indi-
visibility of humanity is not to just reiterate the indivisibility as a pious and a-
historical shibboleth; but rather, to acknowledge rigorously the underlying differ-
ences that constitute the indivisibility of humanity and achieve a critical tran-
scendence of differences in the name of a differential but profoundly relational 
humanity. To put it differently, ontological solidarity has to be unpacked and lived 
coevally as historical difference, namely without any guarantee of a pre-given or 
primordial harmony. The terms and conditions of coexistence will have to be ar-
ticulated as guiding principles and values in the realm of a shared but often con-
flictual and contested history.12  
It is all about community and the founding rationale that makes community 
reasonable, intelligible, and worthy of co-existence. In other words, ‘community’ 
has to be produced as a concept, and not just intended as an ad hoc description of 
random and undirected co-habitation that can easily degenerate into the virulent 
doctrine, for example, of ‘separate, but equal,’ or be valorised vapidly and mean-
inglessly without differentiation. We are all aware of the double-edged nature of 
the word ‘community,’ whereby ‘communitarian’ denotes a collectivity rooted in 
humane/human reason, but ‘communal’ usually denotes exclusionary parochial-
ism easily susceptible to racism, ethnocentrism, blood and guts nationalism, and 
xenophobia. Class, nationality, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, are conceptual cate-
gories that organise fellow feeling and solidarity. As a result, the broad and generic 
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identification, ‘my fellow human being’ gets substituted by the more specific, in-
terested, and ideologically interpellated subjectivations such as ‘my fellow prole-
tarian,’ ‘my fellow American,’ ‘my fellow LGBT activist,’ ‘my fellow postmodern 
feminist,’ ‘my fellow subaltern insurgent,’ ‘my fellow transnational entrepreneur,’ 
‘my fellow Hindu fundamentalist,’ ‘my fellow secular agnostic,’ etc. These latter 
identifications are politically inflected, ideologically fraught and therefore, both 
enabling and limiting in their ontological and human reach. They are enabling to 
the extent that they make possible a certain kind of rational and interested soli-
darity; and limiting in the sense that in enabling one kind of solidarity they rule 
out a different or an opposing form of solidarity.13 These designations are ideolog-
ical constructs and discursive functions that de-naturalise and de-familiarise the 
given-ness of the human with the intention of achieving ‘the human’ not as a fait 
accompli but as the function and end product of political self-reflexivity. They also 
operate as place-markers that in their seeming formal neutrality invite and pre-
cipitate a specific ideological content. A fellow American cannot be a Mexican even 
though the human in the Mexican definitely qualifies for the privilege of ontolog-
ical fellowship: my fellow human being, but not fellow American. Where is fellow-
ship most itself: when left blank and nameless, or when it is filled out by a named 
sovereign belonging? Are communities based on so called ‘natural’ human affinity 
more rational, more real, and more valuable than communities that are posited 
on the ideological coherence of constructed affiliations? When solidarities are in 
a state of conflict, each entrenched intransigently and non-porously in its own silo 
or fiefdom, how indeed should an overarching ontological solidarity be enlivened 
so as to make sense of the conflict and at the same time resolve it in the name of a 
higher, a more worthwhile rationale of inclusion?14 Is the natural itself not con-
structed, and are not constructions naturalised by way of ideologies, axioms, and 
first principles? Are there other modes of envisioning community other than the 
political?15 
To begin to answer this question, I turn to two fictional texts: Tsitsi Dan-
garembga’s Nervous Conditions and Amitav Ghosh’s The Shadow Lines. Most 
students of postcolonial fiction are familiar with the explosive malevolence of the 
opening line of Nervous Conditions: “I wasn't sorry when my brother died.”16 The 
female narrator is relieved, even delighted that her brother is no more. Is her pro-
foundly visceral anti-filial, anti-familial feeling un-natural, even monstrous? Isn’t 
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it evil to feel the way she does about one’s own brother? But readers of Dan-
garembga’s fiction know that though a brother, the brother was no brother at all, 
and did not act like a brother. Dangarembga’s fiction raises the question, Who is 
a brother: the one who just happens to be a brother by virtue of the accident of 
birth, or the stranger, the unrelated one who acts like a brother? It is through the 
performance of similitude, the like, that relationships are truly recognised and 
valorised, and not on the basis of their tautological given-ness or brute facticity. 
One could be a brother factually and chronologically; and yet not be like a brother 
in actual performance and understanding. The titular given-ness of brotherhood 
is no guarantee of its semantic relevance or rectitude. The brother, in this story of 
African patriarchy, sexism, and misogyny in conjunction with the double-edged 
sword known as the legacy of Colonialism, is the enemy and oppressor, whose 
death paves the way for the narrator’s education and future. Had the brother lived 
on, the sister would have had to wallow in the world of abject and uneducated 
domesticity. The brother and his natural consanguinity is a mere given, an acci-
dent of birth that holds no promise for the sister of a meaningful and valuable 
community. If anything, even if he hadn’t actually died, she would have had to 
break relationship with him for her feminist bildungsroman to evolve. The 
brother would have to be disowned by way of an antagonistic recognition. He 
would have been in the way, and would have had to be removed as an obstacle. 
Family and familial structure are not guarantors of freedom or emancipation.17 
Now, to The Shadow Lines, where at the very beginning of the novel, the 
narrator, by way of declaring his epistemological bias, has this to say about human 
relationality and possibilities of meaningful community. “The truth is that I did 
not want to think of her as a relative: to have done that would have diminished 
her and her family-I could not bring myself to believe that their worth in my eyes 
could be reduced to something as arbitrary and unimportant as a blood relation-
ship.”18 The narrator is talking about the importance of his extended family, but 
deeply apprehensive that he may fall prey to the mystique that a family qua family 
is naturally important and valuable. In many ways, this statement sets up the cos-
mopolitan, secular, anti-nationalist, anti-essentialist, anti-identitarian register of 
the novel. The novel refuses to valorise the family as the basic unit either of home 
or world. If anything, family is perceived as a duplicitous alibi, a form of esoteric 
reduction and mystification to be wary of. There is on the one hand the indivisi-
bility of all human experience, and on the other there are “the shadow lines” that 
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divide, compartmentalise, entrench, and embattle experience and perpetuate Us-
Them divides.19 There is, on the one hand, something called experience that seems 
native and/or natal, natural, and intimate; and on the other, there is knowledge 
that seems to come from somewhere else.20 “Places where we live” and “places 
where we think”21 refuse to get coordinated seamlessly in response to some mys-
terious umbilical pull or bind. Autochthony of existence is in dialectical tension 
with the mobile ubiquity of knowledge; home and world are in a relationship of 
reciprocal de-familiarisation, just as ‘coming’ and ‘going’ function in reversible di-
rectionality. To get back to the lines from The Shadow Lines: what is a family, 
what is a community, what is national belonging, what is diasporic or ek-static or 
exo-topic belonging?22 How does belonging eventuate into knowledge? Which be-
longings are rational, and which visceral? Is the basis for belonging synonymous 
or cognate with the basis for knowing and knowledge? Is ‘basis’ the same as ‘need?’ 
Is belonging in and by itself its own form of knowledge? Should knowledge repro-
duce belonging with fidelity; or is this a non-mimetic and perhaps a mutually al-
ienating relationship based not on loyalty but critique? And crucially, what is a so-
called blood relationship relative to other relationships that are not posited on so-
called blood?23 
To be a relative, is that a big deal: clearly not, to the narrator in Ghosh’s 
fiction. And, why not? Because to be related by birth is just the accident of ‘given-
ness.’ No work has gone into this relationship. No one wanted it this way. We do 
not choose our relatives; they are part of a ‘done deal.’ The only way to do justice 
to filiation is to de-naturalise it and reclaim it as a relational affiliation whose 
value and importance is autonomous of the non-logic of mere birth. The narrator 
wants to open up a free and mobile space of representation between Ontology and 
Epistemology, between Being and Knowing so that relationships can have an im-
aginative and rational basis that is not blindly and filiatively complicit.24 He wants 
to open up a genuine breathing space between the comfort of solidarity and the 
oppositional loneliness of critique. He would, as a mature adult, like to tell his 
relative, ‘I find you important and valuable in spite of the fact that you are a rela-
tive by birth,’ ‘I would find you precious and valuable even if you were not related 
to me,’ and also, ‘At this point, I am going to break my relationship with you since 
I find you unacceptable, politically, ethically, ideologically.’ What is at stake here 
is the freedom to choose even if that choice results in moving away, in horror, 
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disgust, revulsion, and utter antagonism from one’s “stubborn attachments” (But-
ler 60).25 The objective is the achievement of “like minds” and not “like bodies” 
(Guinier 149) to avail of Lani Guinier’s formulation.26 The narrator’s emphasis is 
not on the relationship, but on the basis of community and not relationship, but 
relationality. The rationale of connectivity or relationality is neither endemic or 
intrinsic: nor is it already pre-scripted into an existing relationship. The basis or 
the rationale has to be forever open to negotiation, revision, recantation and re-
formulation. Relationality has the endless potentiality to refigure and prevent the 
ossification of community. Relationality can only be in the name of the Open, and 
not in the name of any enclosure that promises to accommodate the Open.  
I want to pay a little extra critical attention to the phrase, “as arbitrary and 
unimportant as a blood relationship.” What relationships are important and why, 
and what is the connection between importance and arbitrariness? And what pre-
cisely is a blood relationship, and what is the ritual significance of the term 
“blood?” What Ghosh is initiating is nothing short of a radical re-evaluation the 
value of value. In other words, value is neither intrinsic nor natural; on the con-
trary, it is only through an act of affiliative alienation that value is produced, and 
not just repeated. Though it has become customary to invoke Home and World 
together as though the two were always already in alignment with each other, it is 
really not clear what the alignment is all about and how it is to be or has been 
achieved.  To put it somewhat provocatively, is it even desirable to think World on 
the basis of Home?27 The general understanding is that Home is somehow natural, 
but the World even though natural has to be actualised through an act of produc-
tion. It would seem that Home and World represent two forms of “givenness,” and 
what is required is an act of mediation or translation between the two.28 If home 
points towards filial pieties and loyalties, world insists that these pieties and loy-
alties should earn the right to be generalised beyond the provincial precincts and 
jurisdictions of home. Perhaps home may have to be re-named, modified radically 
before it can be made to articulate with the World Formulations that employ 
“blood,” perpetrate a form of genetic essentialism based on the assumption that 
blood stands for an unchanging nature to be understood and honored as familial. 
Even though blood is just blood, it gets ideologically misconstrued as Hindu blood, 
Greek blood, Protestant blood.29 What is after all just a point of entry, i.e., the 
given-ness of one’s origins, is normativised as one’s innate and irrefragable na-
ture. Thus, revolts of sons and daughters against their parents are stigmatised as 
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blasphemy, as un-natural acts. Once a Hindu, always a Hindu. It is not for nothing 
that Swami Vivekananda famously declared, “I may have been born into a religion, 
but I don’t have to die in it.”30 
So, what is the mandate of given-ness and what should be owed to given-
ness? Is given-ness a sort of umbilical nature not to be messed around with? To 
borrow from Judith Butler’s powerful formulation, can “stubborn attachments” 
(Butler 60) be loathsome, hateful, even productive of shame and horror? Is it pos-
sible that home could both be a safe haven as well as a site of injustice that war-
rants escape? If every document of civilisation is also a document of barbarism,31 
then by the same token, home too is subject to that same ambivalent logic. In what 
follows, I will be attempting, with the help of Martin Heidegger and Edward Said, 
to sketch notes towards an exilic notion of coexistence that calls into question the 
piety of the formulation of being at home in the world. My argument is that both 
home and world are cut of the same Manichean fabric, each term deeply complicit 
with the ideological burden of the other. My contention is that neither can home 
be de-provincialised and rendered worldly in the name of the all, nor can the ab-
stract and non-denominational generality of the world be domesticated and ren-
dered in the name of home. What is required is a radical deconstruction of both 
terms in the name of an exilic space that refuses the false solace of both home and 
world. Can this de- and re-territorialisation of existential space be actualised in 
the name of an other humanism; or, would this project have to be post-humanist 
both in form and content? Whereas Martin Heidegger would opt for a total disin-
vestment from the metaphysics of humanism, Edward Said is hopeful that what-
ever transformations are necessary can be valorised in the name of humanism.32 
It is not coincidental that Said, despite being deeply aware of Heidegger’s scathing 
ontico-ontological critique of humanism, chooses not to allow that theoretical di-
agnosis come in the way of praxis, of agential action. He prefers not to participate 
in a tout court theoretical break precisely because he wants to hold on to some 
notion of an onto-political agency, albeit flawed and complicit. It is to Said’s ever-
lasting credit that he opts to co-think critique and complicity, co-think praxis and 
theoretical vulnerability, rather than take easy refuge in the notion of a gestural 
theoretical break from humanism.33 Rather than invest his critical energy in is-
sues of essence and or ontico-ontological identity, Said ‘chooses’ to focus on the 
human as agency; and of course as readers of Said know, he was never in favor of 
debunking or debilitating agency in the name of a “post-al” theory that is always 
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too eager to point out the inescapable nature of complicity. Said’s response to this 
has consistently been: complicity is absolute only when you reify structure as an 
ahistorical a priori.  
 So, what would exilic coexistence look and feel like? It would, as Mahmoud 
Darwish’s poems demonstrate, look like ‘nothing’ on earth. It would be ineffable 
in its incalculability as well as unpredictability. Its answerability would indeed be 
to a radical “nothing” bereft of all cartography.34 How would such exilic coexist-
ence play itself between humans, between humans and non-humans, animals, be-
tween humans and Deep Ecology?35 If sovereign names and loyalties are to be de-
constructed or bracketed, in whose or what name should the ‘exilic’ be practiced 
and theorised? Isn’t it unconscionable to be talking allegorically and concept-met-
aphorically about exile when in fact exile as a literal historical is in need of imme-
diate redress? Let me turn to Edward Said’s memorable essay, “Reflections on Ex-
ile” to get at the semantics of the term. “Exile is strangely compelling to think 
about but terrible to experience. It is the unhealable rift forced between a human 
being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness 
can never be surmounted. And while it is true that literature and history contain 
heroic, romantic, glorious, even triumphant episodes in an exile’s life, these are 
no more than efforts meant to overcome the crippling sorrow of estrangement. 
The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of something 
left behind forever.”36 
And yet, why is exile rich food for thought when in reality it is nothing but 
estrangement? How does estrangement become a semantically rich domain in 
thought? What indeed is home and what is location? What is a native place? What 
is the special charge behind the term ‘native place’ that differentiates it from the 
fortuity of any place? What is the difference between these two locutions? Is the 
place more mine, to anticipate the politics of immigration and naturalisation and 
of the diaspora because I was born there? Or, is it more mine than yours because 
I came here before you? And finally, does the place most authentically belong to 
those who are truly autochthonous, whose bodies are literally extensive with the 
physicality of the place? If there is the certitude of home to start with, why do we 
need the intensifier, the authenticator term ‘true’ to differentiate the true home 
from what, the non-true home, the false home, the factitious home? What here is 
mere description, and what prescriptive and normative? If, Palestine is home both 
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to Jews and Palestinians, can it be a true home to both? And is ‘true’ here a cur-
rency of politics, ontology, or theology? To be more specific, which Return, the 
return of the Palestinian or that of the Jew be more equal to the truth of home? 
How does the term ‘true’ function in duplicity: whose truth, the Zionist truth as 
profoundly theological and ahistorical, or the Palestinian truth anchored in the 
horrors of historical defeat, displacement, and negation? The term ‘true’ in Said’s 
discourse resonates both politically and beyond the opportunistic-strategic ra-
tionale of politics.  On the one hand truth can be commandeered and weaponised 
as Israeli or Palestinian with the result that one truth opposes the other. How then 
shall Truth, with a capital Truth, prevail (as in the profound Sanskrit maxim, 
Satyameva jayate, Truth alone will triumph), when the very emergence of Truth 
with a capital T can only be the function of conflict, war, violence, and a resultant 
winner-loser dyad? The problem that Said takes on without flinching is the reality 
that ‘truth’ is neither exclusively political nor ontological; just as worldliness is 
neither the dissolution of individual existence in the name of coexistence nor the 
betrayal of coexistence in the name of individual viability. What does Said mean 
by “essential sadness,” i.e., an incorrigible sadness versus a “historical sadness” 
that is open to amelioration and remediation through dis-alienation and dis-es-
trangement? This is the critical tension between ‘home’ as it has been spoken for 
in the name of the ‘nation’ and that other ‘home’ which has to be violated and 
usurped in the name of the nation state. For there are no exiles in the context of 
that ontological home that is non-sovereign and therefore home to all: prior to the 
violent histories of enclosure and exclusion.37 But when “the ontological open” is 
politicised as national home, it automatically produces the exile as its binary and 
excluded other.38 Allegorically speaking, the ‘other home’ is possible only if we ex-
ile ourselves from the limiting and exclusionary ‘home’ of the nation state,’ only if 
each national citizen occupies her sovereign space in an exilic mode. In other 
words, the exilic mode is a profoundly double-conscious mode of existence: dou-
ble-consciousness and for that reason deconstructive and oppositional.39 My un-
derstanding is that with the adjective “essential,” Said is indeed pointing towards 
ontology, though he would not want to name it as such. His concern, very legiti-
mate, is that ontology, as a philosophically determined realm, would seek to se-
cede altogether from the domain of politics, and absolve itself of all historico-po-
litical contamination. To him, much like it is to Franz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, and 
Denise de Silva, ontology is an effect, an effect perpetrated by politics, and not a 
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realm in itself. The “essential,” to Said, represents a different kind of freedom, i.e., 
‘freedom from the political’ as the far-reaching goal to be envisioned from the per-
spective of ‘freedom in and as political.’ Mahmoud Darwish and Said find common 
cause and ground here. Said’s theoretically unfashionable faith or belief that hu-
manism can be redirected, rectified in the name of humanism is based on his 
deeply secular understanding of the world as nothing but historical.   
Here then is Said: “We come to nationalism and its essential association 
with exile. Nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, a 
heritage. It affirms the home created by a community of language, culture, and 
custom; and, by so doing, it fends of exile, fights to prevent its ravages.” Compar-
ing the nationalism-exile nexus to the master-slave dialectic in Hegel, Said makes 
the general diagnosis that “all nationalisms in their early stages develop a condi-
tion of estrangement” (Said, Reflections on Exile 378).  
The answer to estrangement is home, but what kind of home? Politics com-
pels us to name estrangements and on that basis insist on a Jewish home as an 
answer to Jewish estrangement, a Palestinian home to officially accommodate the 
Palestinian, and so on, and finally and anthropologically, as a human home for 
human displacement. What about a nameless home where the name can be iden-
tified not as a remedy but as a problem?40 It is in this Utopian spirit that Said 
quotes Auerbach who cites this passage from Hugo of St. Victor’s Didascalion: 
“The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom 
every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire 
world is a foreign land” (395). To Auerbach to whom our philological home is the 
Earth and not the nation, the point of entry into his Earth still has to be European 
culture, but from a rigorously cultivated exilic perspective. What this strategy 
avoids is the fallacy of con-centrism that assumes that we move automatically, and 
by fiat, from nation as Center to the Earth or World as Center. On the contrary, 
this option deploys the ‘givenness’ of native or natal culture against the grain and 
dissipates the propriety of a centrist vision. Is this an example of overturning na-
tionalism in the name of nationalism, and humanism in the name of humanism? 
Is such critical self-reflexivity radical enough; or should we be expecting more 
from our oppositional consciousness? 
Edward Said is quite clear about his strategy here. To him, the call for a tout 
court theoretical break from humanism is ill-advised, un-warranted, overblown, 
and just plain impracticable. The question I want to raise here is this: is it feasible 
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to problematise humanism simultaneously both ontologically and politically? Or, 
as Said, contra Heidegger, would have it: is an immanent political critique ade-
quate in the hope that the effects of the political critique will have a bearing on 
ontology as well? Here then is Edward Said at his polemical best, both announcing 
with great clarity his intentions and at the same outlining what he is ‘not’ inter-
ested in. Said’s hope, as a practicing ‘non-humanist humanist’ is that his oversight 
of ontology will not in any way compromise the integrity or the efficacy his politi-
cal praxis. Strange and counter-intuitive as it may seem, it is precisely by insisting 
on the primacy of history and politics, and not that of theory or ontology, that 
Said, like Fanon, seeks a body that is nothing but questions. By way of understand-
ing of the realm of historical politics as oppositional and contrapuntal, Said 
achieves the same effect of openness and non-arrival that is dear to ontologically 
oriented thinkers. The difference is that Said’s strategy is unrelievedly immanent: 
he does not need a vestibule called the onto-political. To put it briefly, exile for 
Said, achieves immanently for Said what ek-stasis does for Heidegger. Here we 
need to remember that even Heidegger who scoffs at a recuperation of humanism 
does follow the strategy of sous rature, the strategy of crossing out rather than 
indulge in a ruptural neologism.41 Said establishes a clear instrumental break be-
tween Heidegger’s  
 
thoroughgoing examination of the relationship of humanism to a prior Being 
in his “Letter on Humanism,” and his program of “humanism as a useable 
praxis for intellectuals and academics who want to know what they are doing, 
what they are committed to as scholars, and who want also to connect those 
principles to the world in which they live as citizens. (Said, Humanism and 
Democratic Criticism 6) 
 
In other words, the deep theoretical and philosophical inherence of humanism in 
metaphysics does not bother Said one bit. He is aware of it in a casual, secondary, 
epiphenomenal kind of way, and he is happy to invest in humanism despite its 
metaphysical provenance.   
Now, if metaphysics is but another name for anthropocentric hubris and 
human-hegemonic unilateralism and violence towards Being, then, metaphysics 
is as reprehensible as say Racism. If that is the case, isn’t Said’s critical-opposi-
tional reliance on humanism no different from say, an anti-racist platform of ac-
tion that is no more and no less than affirmative action without the benefit of crit-
ical race theory or the richness of Afro-pessimism?42 Why will Said not pay suffi-
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cient attention to anthropocentrism, to the second order historiography of meta-
physics that frames and enables what Said calls “secular worldliness?”(Said 49).43 
If Said were also, in addition to being a secular-worldly-oppositional thinker, in-
terested in deep ecology, the philosophical critique of anthropocentrism, and an-
imal rights, would he then have been compelled automatically to pay explicit at-
tention to pre- trans- and non-human beings and temporalities? My larger ques-
tion here has to do with the ways in which our declaration of our polemical inter-
ests, limits, frames, and scotomises our theoretical awareness: in other words, 
what is not within our valued world view does not, so to speak, exist. If Said had 
taken into account the fundamental insight that the violence of humanism has 
already been underwritten by the deeper violence of anthropocentrism, he may 
not have been in a position to claim  
 
that it is possible to be critical of humanism in the name of humanism and 
that, schooled in its abuses by the experience of Eurocentrism and empire, 
one could fashion a different kind of humanism that was cosmopolitan and 
text-and-language-bound in ways that absorbed the great lessons from the 
past from, say, Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer and more recently from Rich-
ard Poirier, and still remain attuned to the emergent voices and contents of 
the present, many of them exilic, extraterritorial, and un-housed, as well as 
uniquely American. (Said 11)44  
 
Implicit in this passage too is, what Abdul JanMohamed identifies as Said’s “spec-
ular” relationship to western humanism. Without a doubt, Said’s epistemic loca-
tion is ‘occidental,’ and his métier is to reflect the West critically back to itself with 
the intention of changing it, correcting it. His warm endorsement and reception 
of subaltern and postcolonial theorists such as Alatas, Guha, and CLR James is 
thoroughly metropolitan in scope and scale. He chooses to map their work as a 
‘voyage in’ whereby the West becomes the locus classicus for an oppositional post-
coloniality. The postcolonial project is no more and no less than admonishing 
western humanism for its erstwhile follies, and eventually opening it up to other, 
non-western, migrant, and diasporic voices and constituencies. We must also keep 
in mind that in Said’s case oppositional thinking and contrapuntality go hand in 
hand. Just as Beethoven does sing for Du Bois, so too, for Said, a self-correcting 
West is very much part of his belonging and constituency. In other words, no 
change in the imprimatur, still human and all too human but with a different and 
enlarged and more inclusive space that lets in different and other contents. The 
same charge could be leveled at Said’s refusal to problematise secularism in any 
way.45 
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Let me turn now to Heidegger’s very different theorisation of coexistence 
under the aegis of humanism. Here is Heidegger’s definition of a ‘new humanism’ 
that will return ‘man’ to his ontological essence, i.e., to what ‘man’ was intended 
to be, but was prevented and occluded from becoming because of anthropocentric 
politics and faulty propositional thinking that made the ‘human’ the illicit ‘subject’ 
of Being.  
 
The essence of man lies in ek-sistence. That is what is essentially-that is, 
from Being itself-at issue here, in so far as Being appropriates man as ek-
sisting for guardianship over the truth of Being into this truth itself. “Hu-
manism” now means, in case we decide to retain the word, that the essence 
of man is essential for the truth of Being, specifically in such a way that the 
word does not pertain to man simply as such. So, we are thinking a curious 




Should we still keep the name of “humanism” for a “humanism” that con-
tradicts all previous humanism-although it no way advocates the inhu-
man? And keep it just so that by sharing in the use of the name we might 
perhaps swim in the predominant currents, stifled in metaphysical subjec-
tivism and submerged in oblivion of Being? Or should thinking, by means 
of open resistance to “humanism,” risk a shock that should for the first time 
cause perplexity concerning the humanitas of homo humanus and its ba-
sis? In this way it could awaken a reflection–if the world-historical moment 
did not itself already compel such a reflection—that thinks not only about 
man but also about the “nature” of man, not only about his nature but even 
more primordially about the dimension in which the essence of man, de-
termined by Being itself, is at home. (Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” 
248)  
 
Is this ek-static practice of humanism a humanism at all: a humanism that in be-
ing about “man” is not about man at all, a humanism that eviscerates man of 
his/her sovereign subjectivity? For, it must be noted that what Heidegger is calling 
for is not a sublation of humanism to a higher or more rarefied plane; and he is 
not asking for post-humanism or even for a polycentric poly-polar humanism. His 
demand is either for anti-humanism or a-humanism. He is demanding the erasure 
of humanism as such.46 Essential man, to find his true home in Being has to un-
home himself from his own ideological habitat, namely, humanism and its politi-
cal corollary, nationalism and the nation state. Ek-static ontological practice re-
quires an exilic humanist-nationalist orientation. To recuperate such an aware-
ness coercively under the rubric of humanism-nationalism, constitutes for 
Heidegger, an egregious categorical error. And yet, disastrously, for a while, 
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Heidegger succumbs to the “authenticity” of National Socialism.47 It is quite obvi-
ous how Heidegger establishes a direct causal relationship between humanism’s 
obsession with just man and its oblivion of Being: the two are but flip sides of the 
same coin. I will just mention in passing that the outright rejection of humanism 
by Afro-Pessimism is based on a rationale that is both compatible and radically 
incommensurable with the Heideggerian measure or threshold of anti-humanism. 
Whereas to Heidegger, humanism and ontology are a given that are open to de-
struction, Afro-pessimism’s thesis of anti-black humanism, humanism and ontol-
ogy are not even relevant as interlocutors. 
 
In the face of the essential homelessness of man, man’s approaching des-
tiny reveals itself to thought on the history of Being in this, that man find 
his way into the truth of Being and set out on this find. Every nationalism 
is metaphysically an anthropologism, and as such subjectivism. National-
ism is not overcome through mere internationalism: it is rather expanded 
and elevated thereby into a system. Nationalism is as little brought and 
raised to humanitas by internationalism as individualism is by an ahistor-
ical collectivism. (Heidegger, 244) 
 
This passage highlights some of the aporias that challenge Heideggerian thinking.  
To start with, Heidegger, despite his strong desire to get rid of humanism tout 
court, continues to hanker after a true and authentic humanitas, albeit in the 
nameless name of the Dasein. The measure of the ek-static human as Dasein is a 
custodial measure on behalf of the openness and the unconcealedness of the ‘be-
ing of Being.’ The human deterritorialised as Dasein is rid of the exceptionalist 
hubris both of humanism and anthropocentrism begins to function as a site or 
platform for the shining forth of Being. In that sense, then, Heidegger too, despite 
his downright disdain for any reworking of humanist-nationalism, is holding on 
strategically to the human re-identified as Dasein for the project of de-structing 
the entire tradition of the western, metaphysical, onto-theological, logocentric tra-
dition. It is also quite evident how difficult it is for Heidegger to permit his exclu-
sively ontological hermeneutic to lapse into the register of politics and history. 
When he did, he succumbed to the authenticity of National Socialism. The prob-
lem is that unlike the Dasein in all its pristine ontological-philosophical aloofness, 
Mitsein starkly raises the problem of historical co-existence: in other words, the 
Dasein-Mitsein continuum is neither entirely ontological nor political. It is a hy-
brid onto-political continuum that calls the philosophical/ontological bluff of a 
pure ek-stasis. Historically determinate configurations of the Mitsein, such as the 
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nationalism, Christendom, Judaism, Zionism, etc. are not automatically amena-
ble to the ek-static call of the Dasein, unless the articulation of the register of the 
onto-political is given its due weight and consequence. All I am trying to say here 
is that Said, in declaring himself as a non-humanist humanist is in fact historically 
and politically actualising the Heideggerian project better, more convincingly and 
in better faith than Heidegger himself. 
Here is another passage from the same Heidegger text that when read to-
gether with the passage on nationalism would seem to align the ontological with 
the political without mutual conflation or reduction. 
 
Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to 
be the ground of one. Every determination of the essence of man that al-
ready presupposes an interpretation of being without asking about the 
truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is metaphysical. The result is that 
what is peculiar to all metaphysics, specifically with respect to the way the 
essence of man is determined, is that it is “humanistic.” Accordingly, every 
humanism remains metaphysical. (Heidegger, 225-6) 
 
To a non-Heideggerian, the claim that every nationalism is inescapably metaphys-
ical would sound like pure babble, i.e., until she is schooled in the process of 
Heideggerian ontopolitical mediation: from metaphysics to humanism, and from 
humanism to nationalism, a concatenated and co-symptomatic syndrome of the 
same pathology. Why is it enough and more than adequate for Said to oppose and 
transcend humanism in the name of humanism, whereas to Heidegger such a 
claim is self-defeating and counterproductive? Why does Said choose not to take 
the implication of politics in ontology seriously? In not factoring in the inherence 
of the political in the prior temporality of metaphysics and ontology, Said misses 
out on the opportunity to interrogate and deconstruct the political as such in the 
name of the exilic: a value that he cherishes deeply. Exile, in being the lack of 
home, points to an other and different possibility of home foreclosed by the regime 
of the nation state: that nameless and indivisible “dwelling” under the Open48 that 
discerns in the desire for home the desire to dominate and exclude. The realm of 
the political in the name of the nation state functions duplicitously: creates a na-
tional home for ‘refugees,’ and offers them ‘rights,’ but only to perpetuate the di-
vide between citizens and refugees. It is also unable to question, in the name of a 
higher and more inclusive emancipation, the hegemony of the discourse of rights. 
To put it in Foucauldian terms, any form of absolute and innocent reliance in the 
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discourse of rights is to forget that the very history of reason has been unreason-
able and that ‘rights’ are the sedimented ideological continuation of an underlying 
logic of an Us and a Them.  
As Said would have it:  
 
And just beyond the frontier between “us” and the “outsiders” is the peri-
lous territory of not-belonging: this is to where in a primitive time peoples 
were banished, and where in the modern era immense aggregates of hu-
manity loiter as refugees and displaced persons. (Said, Reflections on Exile 
17) 
 
Said goes on to argue that precisely “because both terms (nationalism and exile) 
include everything from the most collective of sentiments to the most private of 
emotion, there is hardly a language adequate for both” (380). Once we accept this 
chronic complicity (I am reminded here of Fanon’s explosive destruction of the 
binary logic of racism: “The Negro is not. Any more than a white man” (Fanon 
180). Said asks: “What is there worth saving and holding on to between the ex-
tremes of exile on the one hand, and the often bloody-minded affirmations of na-
tionalism on the other? Are they simply two conflicting varieties of paranoia?” 
(Said, “Reflections on Exile” 380). Said then offers us the specific example of Is-
rael and Zionism and the ongoing Palestinian exile. Asks Said: “What could be 
more intransigent than the conflict between the Zionist Jews and Arab Palestini-
ans? Palestinians feel that they have been turned into exiles by the proverbial peo-
ple of exile, the Jews” (Said 382). Both groups are aware that their drive towards 
nationalism has been fuelled by exile: both groups feel the necessity for blood 
brothers and blood sisters and for fierce forms of loyalty and “where the slightest 
deviation from the accepted group line is an act of the rankest treachery and dis-
loyalty” (383). 
Homes as seductive spaces of the natural always unmark themselves. Even 
though deeply ideological as Hindu homes, Islamic homes, middle class homes, 
Protestant homes, patriarchal homes, homes like to see themselves as apolitical 
and at the same time as value laden in some mystical immaculate manner. Sec-
ondly, homes breed intellectual and critical torpor: homes are sites of compla-
cency where critiques and self-reflexivity are disarmed in the name of filial piety 
and loyalty: my dad/mom/family right or wrong. It is on the basis of the point of 
entry called home that the world becomes imaginable. But the world alas is not 
home as when we discover simple things like, the culinary smells that are so nat-
ural and desirable to us are repugnant and nauseating to some other family. We 
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realise with some consternation that the way we do things in our home is no more 
and no less than what it is: the way we do things in our home. There is no built-in 
normativity or axiomatic rectitude scripted into our particular practices. Famili-
arity turns into legitimacy without the benefit of critique. So, if this is home, what 
is the world? In fact, there is no world for the simple reason that once we step out 
of our domestic ghettos, all we encounter are other such homes, other such do-
mestic enclaves and enclosures each with its own built-in walls of intended inclu-
sion and exclusion. What we have are specific human ideological homes each with 
its own particular pretense of utter worldliness.    
Here is the tough double-bind. If the world, or worldliness, is to be realised 
in an egalitarian multi-lateral way, then, all homely aspirations will have to be 
abandoned, towards a higher and more inclusive belonging which, I must quickly 
add, should not be hastily renamed as the Home of all homes. A truly realised 
World will have to be un-homely from every conceivable perspective, and ergo, 
sovereign citizenship will be demanded of no one. So long as we continue to play 
the binary game of Home and World, we will only continue repeating the sorry 
and abject production of winners and losers, the homed and the un-homed, and 
an Us and a Them mode of subject production based on the twin principles of 
regulatory self-exceptionalism and the inclusion of the other by exclusion.49 If the 
objective of coexistence is a-centric, non-identitarian, inclusive in the name of the 
Open (whether intended by way of Agamben or the Four Fold of Heidegger, or the 
radical concept of the vetta veli as sung by the Tamil Siddhar poet50), then, the 
existential dynamic of the exilic will have to be built in differentially into the fabric 
of coexistence: exilic coexistence. I say built-in to avoid the fallacy of exilic essen-
tialism. Also, the exilic condition as concept metaphor is not to be idealised in an 
irresponsible mode when there are actual, empirical, literal exiles languishing in 
utter abjection. Exilic consciousness and exilic self-fashioning need to be woven 
in integrally into all regnant modes of being and knowing. To refer briefly to a 
motif I have written about elsewhere, the imperative Admit All has to be under-
stood and practiced in the name of no one.51 The Admit All has to be heard as an 
ashareeri, a disembodied command that privileges no particular body or embod-
iment, an imperative in the name of the Nothing, of radical absence. If the ques-
tion is: who said, ADMIT ALL, then, the answer ought to be ‘NO ONE.’ The all-
important question of course, in the context of onto-political hyphenation is this: 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:30:43 |
 





Synthesis 13 (2020) 
 
174 
If All are already there, naked and fully embodied, why then the official/govern-
mental redundancy of the call/interpellation, Admit All? The answer would go 
somewhat like this: once the exilic mode is organically and generally integrated 
with the exigencies of ‘political homes,’ then every political residence will also 
have to actualise itself both as restrictive structure and the constitutive void that 
forms the very basis of structure. In other words, the Open as the Void will have 
been honored and valorised as a perennial ‘reading against the grain’ of each and 
every political formation: as that radical hors texte whose reliance on the text is 
merely procedural and not real, formal but not substantive, an exilic beat and in-
terruption at the very heart of each and every political pulsation.  
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Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior. 	
25 For a statement and critique of primary attachments, refer to the work of Judith Butler 
in The Psychic Life of Power. 	
26 See Lani Guinier, Tyranny of the Majority.	
27 For a devastatingly critical reading of home as phobic, see Gloria Anzaldua, Borderlands. 
The creative work of Rabindranath Tagore and the critical theoretical work of Partha Chat-
terjee are relevant here.  	
28 For more on givenness, please refer to the work of the great phenomenological thinkers, 
Edmund Husserl, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception.	
29 I do not have the time or the scope here to look into the concept of martyrdom or those 
causes in whose name blood is shed: extreme situations that require redemption by the 
guarantee that “blood will not have been shed in vain,” situations where blood achieves a 
level of specific fungibility in the context of a non-dialectical, it is either you or me antago-
nism.  On the one hand there is the eponymy of blood, and on the other, there is a produc-
tive relational undecidability whereby any cause could be served by mixed or multiple 
bloods, as much via affiliation as via consanguinary filiation.	
30 See Gauri Viswanathan’s Outside the Fold on the politics of conversion.	
31 See Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”	
32 William V. Spanos’s work on Edward Said and Hannah Arendt as Exiles in the City is 
particularly noteworthy for its post-colonially inflected “non-humanist humanism.” 	
33 See William V. Spanos, R. Radhakrishnan, and Mina Karavanta for more on humanism 
and post-humanism.	
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34 See Mahmoud Darwish’s poems, “If I were another,” and “Who am I, Without Exile?” 
See also William V. Spanos, and R. Radhakrishnan.	
35 I have attempted to theorize “betweenness” in my History, the Human, and the World 
Between. See also Edward said, “Criticism Between Culture and System.”  	
36 Edward Said, “Reflections on Exile.”	
37 The massive and brilliant work of William V. Spanos does more than justice to the theme 
of the onto-political.  See also Robert Marzec’s work on the ontopolitics of enclosure move-
ments.	
38 The troubled and contradictory history of Zionism and its many versions and variations 
is exemplary of this predicament. See also Edward Said, “Zionism from the Standpoint of 
its Victims,” and Judith Butler’s recent work on her relationship to Zionism, Parting Ways.	
39 I am working on this issue comprehensively in my forthcoming essay, “The Open Inc.”	
40 For a profound enactment of the historical as well as allegorical theme of naming and 
un-naming, see Adrienne Rich’s poem, “Diving into the Wreck,” and my analysis of the 
poem in History, the Human, and the World Between.	
41 For more on the Heidegger-Said-Spanos connection by way of exile and the “nothing,” 
see both my essay and Karavanta’s in the special issue of boundary2 in honor of William 
V. Spanos.	
42 See the work of Frank Wilderson, Jared Sexton, and Kimberle Crenshaw on Critical Race 
Theory and Afro-pessimism.	
43 See William V. Spanos, The Legacy of Edward Said, and my essay in boundary2, “In the 
Name of the Nothing.”	
44 On the nature of Violence as both ontological and political, see Merleau-Ponty and Frantz 
Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth.	
45 Unlike theorists such as Talal Asad, Sabah Mahmood, Wael Hallaq, Partha Chatterjee, 
Ashis Nandy, Gil Andjar, and William Connolly, to name a few, who have legitimate and 
substantive issues with secularism, Said is a happy citizen of the secular world.  	
46 The strategy of sous rature is initiated by Heidegger and continued differentially by 
Jacques Derrida.	
47 For a withering critique of Heidegger and authenticity, see Theodor Adorno, The Jargon 
of Authenticity.	
48 See Giorgio Agamben, The Open.	
49 I refer here of course to Giorgio Agamben’s profound notion of “inclusion by exclusion.” 	
50  I explicate the notion of the Open in the Diddhar poem in my forthcoming essay, “Open 
Inc.”	
51 I refer here to the book cover of Edward Said’s posthumously published Humanism and 
Democratic Criticism, and my discussion of the Admit all motif in chapter 2 of my book, 
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